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ABSTRACT
Most young households simultaneously hold both unsecured debt on which they pay an average of
10 percent interest and social security wealth on which they earn less than 2 percent. We document
this fact using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We then consider a life-cycle model
with optimizing and “rule-of-thumb” households and explore ways to reduce this inefficiency. We
show that both allowing households to use social security wealth to pay off debt and exempting
young households from social security contributions (but in both cases requiring higher
contributions later later in life) leads to increases in welfare for both types of households and
significant increases in consumption and saving, and reductions in debt, for optimizing households.
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The starting point for our analysis is the observation that currently households have
about $700 billion in unsecured debt on which they pay roughly 10 percent interest
and $11 trillion of social security wealth on which they earn less than 2 percent
interest.1 As a nation, we are apparently borrowing on credit cards and saving in
a passbook savings account, something that Gross and Souleles (2002) describe as,
“puzzling, apparently inconsistent with no-arbitrage and thus inconsistent with any
conventional model.”
We focus on the old-age portion of social security and explore this topic in three
steps. First, in Section 2, we examine the composition of individuals who own both
non-collateralized debt and social security wealth. In an economy with heterogenous
agents, it is possible that the households that have the debt and the households that
have the wealth are diﬀerent. We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
to show that this is generally not the case. In our sample of households under the
age of 40, 62 percent of households have unsecured debt. We show that if households
could access their social security wealth to pay oﬀ debt, only 17 percent would still
have debt. And for that 17 percent, total debt would be dramatically reduced; for the
90th percentile household in the debt distribution, unsecured debt would fall from 84
percent to 33 percent of that household’s average income.
In Section 3, we construct a dynamic life-cycle portfolio choice model. We follow
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and others by assuming that the world is populated by
two types of households: optimizing households that use ﬁnancial assets to maximize
utility and “rule-of-thumb” households that simply set consumption equal to income.
Evidence from the consumption literature suggests that households roughly break
1 Our measure of unsecured debt is “consumer revolving credit” from the Federal Reserve Board
– which was $725.0 billion in May 2003. Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003) argue that the interest
rate on unsecured debt, taking default into account, is roughly 10 percent in real terms. The value
of social security wealth, deﬁned as “the present actuarial value of the Social Security beneﬁts to
which the current population will be entitled at age 65 (or are already entitled to if they are older
than 65) minus the present actuarial value of the social security taxes that they will pay before
reaching that age,” comes from Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001). Leimer (1994) calculates that the
internal rate of return on social security contributions is 1.7 percent.
1into these two categories, especially with respect to retirement.2 For the optimizing
households, we adapt a model developed by Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003). In that
model, households can invest in stocks and bonds and can also take out unsecured
loans. We specify that the interest rate on unsecured debt (i.e., the borrowing rate)
exceeds the interest rate on bonds (i.e., the lending rate). Such an assumption is
consistent with the pattern of observed interest rates.3 We show that our parameteri-
zation of this model can roughly match the life-cycle borrowing behavior documented
in Section 2.
In Section 4, we analyze the eﬀects of two policy experiments aimed at alleviating
the ineﬃciency of simultaneous debt and social security holdings. In our ﬁrst experi-
ment, we allow households currently in the social security system to access their social
security wealth to pay oﬀ debt. In our second experiment, we build on an idea due to
Hubbard and Judd (1987) and exempt young households from social security contri-
butions. Under both proposals, households would contribute more to social security
(via higher taxes) later in life to compensate for their reduced contributions while
young. Such an assumption ensures unchanged social security beneﬁts upon retire-
ment. Both of the above proposals lead to increases in saving, reductions in debt and
substantial increases in lifetime certain equivalent consumption. Table 1 summarizes
some key results in the paper. For example, moving from our existing system to one
where households under 30 are exempt from contributing to social security (but are
forced to make up the taxes later in life) raises certain equivalent consumption by 3.4
percent for optimizing households and 3.3 percent for rule-of-thumb households.
It is easy to see that exempting young households from social security taxes will
tilt household social security contributions so that they are more in line with desired
life-cycle saving. Given realistic income proﬁles, most households under the age of 30
want to borrow not save. But what is surprising is that the exemption also reduces
the distortions that result from the fact that social security requires investment of
all contributions in an asset that pays 2 percent interest and does not allow any
2See the discussion in Section 1.1 below.
3See Davis et al., 2003.
2investment in equity which has historically returned 8 percent. We illustrate this
surprising fact in Section 4.
Finally, we draw attention to one other possibility oﬀered by our experiments. By
either giving an exemption or allowing a withdrawal but requiring higher contributions
later, the government eﬀectively loans money to households. We call the interest rate
on such loans the internal borrowing rate (IBR). The conditions we impose imply
that the IBR equals the internal rate of return on social security investment. But the
welfare gains from these “loans” are so big that the government could charge a higher
IBR and still make households better oﬀ. Table 1 shows that a combination of the
age 40 exemption and an increase in the IBR from 2 percent to 5 percent still leads
to a signiﬁcant increase in welfare for both types of households. We also show that
raising the IBR would signiﬁcantly improve social security ﬁnances. In other words,
we show that the government could borrow at 2 percent, lend at 5 percent and still
make households better oﬀ!
Before continuing with the paper, we draw the reader’s attention to ﬁve important
aspects of our analysis.
First, social security has a purpose in our setup. That purpose comes from the
existence of rule-of-thumb households. Table 1 shows that eliminating social security
altogether makes optimizing households better oﬀ than any of our proposed policy
changes. This is a consequence of the fact that households can at least replicate
social security privately in our setup. But for rule-of-thumb households, eliminating
social security would be catastrophic as it is their only resource to fund consumption
in retirement. In this sense, our analysis follows Feldstein (1985), who writes, “The
principle rationale for such mandatory programs is that some individuals lack the
foresight to save for their retirement years.” Our goal is to build a social security
system that is “paternalistic” in the sense of Diamond (1977), but we also take into
account the needs of optimizing households, for whom mandated social security may
be welfare reducing.
Second, we do not make any assumption about how social security is funded. Nor
do we take any stand on changing the ﬁnancing of the social security system. Our
3main vantage point is that of the individual household, which contributes money to
social security while working and receives beneﬁts in retirement with certainty. We
use the internal rate of return estimated by Leimer (1994) to link contributions with
beneﬁts, but we do not assume that the social security system invests the contribu-
tions in an individual account or in a pension fund. However, we measure the eﬀects
of various social security schemes on the diﬀerence between annual contributions by
workers and annual retiree beneﬁts at various points in time – in other words how
our proposals would aﬀect the solvency of a pay-as-you-go system. But, it should be
stressed again that our policy experiments are designed to leave the beneﬁt portion
of social security unchanged.
Third, we assume that households do not face any longevity risk. This is an im-
portant omission as some researchers argue that by providing an indexed life annuity,
social security allows households to manage longevity risk.4 Further, they argue that
markets fail to provide such annuities. This beneﬁt of social security is missing from
our model. However, none of our proposed schemes – except our “straw man” of
eliminating social security altogether – have any eﬀect on the retirement portion of
social security. Thus the beneﬁts shown in Table 1 and elsewhere in the paper are
incremental to the social beneﬁts of a mandated, indexed life annuity.
Fourth, in all of our policy experiments, we require that households contribute at
least as much in present value terms and receive exactly the same beneﬁts as they
do in the current system. For example, we consider allowing households to remove
their wealth from social security to pay oﬀ debt. But we do not allow them to “opt
out” of social security at all – in fact their subsequent contributions go up. So our
experiment is completely diﬀerent from, for example, Smetters and Walliser (2002),
who allow household to leave social security entirely. In addition, our model preserves
the “commitment” aspect of social security. Some researchers (Akerlof, 1998, for
example) have argued that households do not trust themselves to save and vote for a
government program that makes it illegal for them not to. The options we consider
change only the life-cycle structure of social security not the level of contributions:
4See Abel (1986) and Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985), among others.
4social security will still require that households save enough to guarantee an income
equal to 43 percent of their average working income in retirement.
Finally, the main point of the paper – that the ideal life-cycle proﬁle of contri-
butions is not ﬂat – applies equally well to any tax. Given the choice, households
with a hump-shaped income proﬁle would rather pay less income tax when young
and more income tax when middle-aged. We focus on social security for two reasons.
First, unlike income taxes, the explicit purpose of social security is to smooth life-
cycle consumption. So it is particularly ironic that the contribution structure does
precisely the opposite at certain points in the life-cycle. Second, a progressive income
tax approximates the ideal life-cycle structure by lowering tax rates when income
is low. Since social security taxation is, in fact, regressive, not progressive, it is a
natural target for our analysis.
Before proceeding with the main body of the paper, we conduct a brief literature
review. In our concluding section, we discuss some additional limitations of our
analysis.
1.1 Literature review
This paper builds on earlier work in four ﬁelds: social security, consumer credit,
life-cycle portfolio choice and consumption.
Many researchers have explored the eﬀects of social security on the economy. For
a survey, see Feldstein and Liebman (2002). We draw the reader’s attention to three
particularly relevant papers. Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) propose that we re-
place the current pay-as-you-go social security system with individual accounts in
which households can invest in equity and calculate the eﬀects on retirement income.
They ﬁnd that people typically do better with individual accounts although there
is a small probability that they will do worse. Hubbard and Judd (1987) look at a
dynamic general equilibrium model of social security in which households face bor-
rowing constraints.5 They show, as we do, that an exemption from social security
5 Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (2003) make a similar point.
5contributions early in the life-cycle yields substantial welfare beneﬁts. Our set-up is
much richer in that we include risky assets and borrowing in the household portfolio
choice set and consider rule-of-thumb as well as optimizing households. On the other
hand, our model is set in partial equilibrium. In the conclusion, we brieﬂy discuss
general equilibrium aspects of the problem and other relevant literature. Imrohoroglu,
Imrohoroglu and Joines (2003), like Hubbard and Judd, consider a dynamic general
equilibrium model. However, they allow households to have time-inconsistent pref-
erences, building on the idea of Akerlof (1998), among others, that social security
exists precisely because time-inconsistent household demand a commitment device.
In their model, social security “may raise or lower welfare depending on the strength
of time inconsistency.” Their results for time-inconsistent households contrast with
our results for “rule-of-thumb” households for whom social security is unambiguously
welfare improving.
Gross and Souleles (2002), Durkin (2000) and Kennickell, Starr-McCluer and
Surette (2000), among others, have documented the increasing importance of un-
secured debt – and in particular credit card debt – in household portfolios.
Researchers have recently started to focus attention on the eﬀects of borrowing
limitations on life-cycle portfolio choice.6 We build on this literature by extending
a model due to Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003). Davis, Kubler and Willen limit
borrowing not through a cap on the amount but by introducing a wedge between the
cost of borrowing and the risk-free interest rate. They argue that a wedge is both
empirically evident and that a model that incorporates a wedge leads to a more real-
istic proﬁle of life-cycle portfolio holdings. Campbell, Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout
(2001) explore the eﬀects on portfolio choice and utility of allowing households to
invest some of their social security wealth in equities in a life-cycle model with no
borrowing. They ﬁnd that a combination of smaller contributions and investment in
equities leads to substantial welfare increases.
6Some examples include Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002) who explore the eﬀects
of borrowing limitations on asset pricing. Gomes and Michaelides (2003) explore the eﬀects of
participation costs in conjunction with borrowing limitations.
6Altig and Davis (1992) consider the eﬀects of a wedge between borrowing and
lending rates in an overlapping generations model. They ﬁnd that the wedge dramat-
ically aﬀects the timing of bequests. Our ﬁndings, that a wedge aﬀects the optimal
timing of contributions, are similar in spirit.
Finally, recent work in the consumption literature motivates our decision to cat-
egorize consumers as optimizing or rule-of-thumb. Researchers have shown that con-
sumers roughly matching the two deﬁnitions coexist in the data, particularly with
respect to retirement. Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) argue that drops in
household consumption at retirement “are consistent with ‘rule of thumb’... theories
of wealth accumulation.” Both Hurst (2003) and Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun
(2003) argue that an optimizing model describes consumption behavior at retirement
for roughly 80 percent of the population and while a rule-of-thumb model describes
the remaining 20 percent.
2 Empirical facts about borrowing and social se-
curity
2.1 Data
The PSID is a large, nationally representative survey, started in 1966 that tracks
social and economic variables of a given household over time. Each year, the survey
gathers demographic information such as age, race, family composition and education
levels of all members in each household. Among other information, individuals report
their labor market participation and earned labor income.
On occasion, the PSID supplements the main data set with special modules. In
1984, 1989, 1994 and 1999, the PSID asked households extensive questions about
their wealth. Speciﬁcally, households report holdings of cash, stocks, bonds, mu-
tual funds, saving accounts, checking accounts, government savings bonds, Treasury
bills, Individual Retirement Accounts, bond funds, cash value of life insurance poli-
cies, valuable collections for investment purposes, and rights in a trust or estate.
7Additionally, respondents report the value of their main home, the value of their out-
standing mortgage debt, and their net positions in other real estate, businesses and
vehicle ownership. Of particular interest to this study is the respondents’ report of
their holdings of unsecured debt (including store and credit card debt, student loans
and other personal loans).
The time-series aspect of the PSID makes it ideal for measuring social security
wealth. While the PSID does not have actual social security records for each respon-
dent, social security wealth can be computed using the household’s detailed earnings
history coupled with the social security tax tables.7
Given that the PSID measures wealth (and indebtedness) at ﬁve year intervals
starting in 1984, we focus our analysis on the 1999 wealth supplement. There are
two reasons for this approach. First, in order to compute social security wealth, we
need a long history of earnings for each individual in the survey. Using the 1999 data
thus allows us as many as 31 annual observations of individual earnings. Second,
innovation in ﬁnancial markets resulted in an explosion in credit card use between
the late 1980s and the late 1990s. Focusing on more recent time periods, therefore,
may provide a more representative picture of a household’s steady state holdings of
unsecured debt. However, for completeness, we redid our analysis for a sample of
1989 households and our main conclusions were unchanged.
Our main sample included all household heads in the 1999 PSID between the ages
of 22 and 40. We focused on younger households since most unsecured borrowing oc-
curs among younger households. Unfortunately, we do not have full earnings histories
for all households heads in the sample. To see why, note two things. First, the PSID
only tracks core PSID members over time. A core PSID member is either an original
respondent from 1968 (when the survey started) or a descendent of an original sample
member. Second, given PSID deﬁnitions, the male is classiﬁed as the household head
for all married and cohabiting couples. As a result, for some male PSID heads, earn-
ings histories only extend back to the date that they married into the survey. Rather
than imputing the missing income history for these household heads, we restrict our
7See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/HOP/hopi.htm.
8sample to include 1) all single headed households (both male and female) and 2) all
married households where the head has complete earnings histories. Given that all
the households in the 1999 PSID under the age of 40 are descendants who are equally
likely to be men or women, our restriction does not bias our analysis in any way.
In summary, our 1999 PSID sample includes all unmarried households with heads
between the age of 22 and 40 and married households with heads between the age of
22 and 40 where the head also has a complete earnings history. The resulting sample
size was 2,077 households. For robustness, we also examine only single households
where the head is between 22 and 40. This latter sample included 850 households.
2.2 Discussion of data
Our analysis of the data reveals three key facts. First, young households have large
amounts of unsecured debt. Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics about our
sample. 62 percent of households under the age of 40 have positive amounts of
unsecured debt. The median and mean amount of debt held for households in our
sample was, respectively, $1,200 and $6,400. For those that hold positive amounts
of debt, the median debt held was $5,600 while the mean amount of debt held was
$10,500.8 The results are equally striking when comparing total household debt in
1999 to the household head’s current 1999 income. The median debt to income ratio
is 5 percent; the mean is 36 percent.9 Households who have positive unsecured debt
tend to be slightly younger, more likely to be married and less likely to be black.
Income of the household head is not a strong predictor, however, of the household’s
8All dollar amounts in this paper are in 1996 constant dollars.
9Unlike the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the PSID does not distinguish between total
debt and revolving debt. Some households may have a positive amount of debt at anytime during
the month for transaction reasons. These households may intend to payoﬀ the debt before they
accrue any interest charges. We would like to focus on households that hold revolving debt (i.e.,
who carry balances forward from month to month). Of those households who report positive credit
card balances in the PSID, most hold more debt than can be justiﬁed by a transaction motive. In
our sample, we ﬁnd that 46 percent of all households (or 75 percent of households with debt), have
accumulated debt greater than one month’s worth of income. This ﬁnding is consistent with data
from the 1995 SCF which ﬁnds that 56 percent of all households pay interest on their credit card
balance on a monthly basis (Gross and Souleles, 2002).
9propensity to have debt. This result is not surprising given that both low income and
high income households hold little, if any, unsecured debt. Low income households are
unable to obtain debt, despite their desire to borrow, while high income households
have less need to borrow. Among households that have some debt – i.e. 62 percent
of our sample – the median debt to income ratio is 22 percent and the mean is 58
percent.
If individuals are constrained by social security contributions, we would expect
that those households with debt would have a negative net asset position. To explore
this question, we deﬁne three measures of household wealth. First, we examine house-
hold “total net worth,” which includes vehicle holdings, real estate equity (including
main home equity), business equity, stocks, corporate bonds, cash, checking accounts,
saving accounts and Treasuries less unsecured debt.10 Second, we create a measure of
liquid assets by subtracting illiquid assets from our measure of net worth. We deﬁne
illiquid assets as business equity, housing equity and vehicle equity. We refer to this
measure as “net liquid assets.” Finally, we realize that cash, saving accounts, and
checking accounts may be used to make monthly purchases. As a result, they are not
measures of the stock of a household’s wealth. To account for this, we remove these
resources from our measure of net illiquid assets. Essentially, our measure of “net
ﬁnancial wealth” is the sum of stock wealth plus bond wealth less non-collateralized
debt.
Most of the households in the sample have positive net worth in spite of their
unsecured debt. Table 3 shows that only 16 percent of the total sample and 26 percent
of those with positive debt have negative net worth. However, most of total net worth
is accounted for by home equity and assets, which provide limited liquidity (net
vehicle equity, for example). If we look at “net ﬁnancial assets,” we get a completely
diﬀerent picture. Table 3 shows that 50 percent of the households in the sample have
negative net ﬁnancial assets and 82 percent of the households with unsecured debt
10The is the full PSID wealth deﬁnition. See Hurst, Luoh and Staﬀord (1998) for a thorough
discussion. Up through the top 2 percentiles, the PSID wealth data compares very well to the SCF
wealth data (Juster and Staﬀord, 1999).
10have negative net ﬁnancial assets. Our sample does indicate that some households do
have positive holdings of stocks and bonds at the same time that they have unsecured
debt. To see this, look at Table 2, which shows that the median household with
positive debt has net ﬁnancial assets equal to -16 percent of income but debt equal
to 22 percent of income. In other words, if they used their ﬁnancial assets to pay
oﬀ debt, they would could reduce their debt load from 22 percent of income to 16
percent. However, the PSID data tells us neither the interest rate on the debt nor
the return on the assets. If the return on stocks is suﬃciently high or the interest on
the debt is suﬃciently low, such debt reduction would not be sensible. By contrast,
the interest rate on unsecured debt always exceeds the interest rate on social security
contributions.
The life cycle proﬁle of debt is as expected. Young households have steep income
proﬁles, on average. As a result, the PIH would predict that young households should
be indebted. As they age, and their income proﬁles ﬂatten out, the propensity to be
in debt should diminish. These predictions are borne out in the data. Table 4 shows
that the median debt to income ratio rises slightly from 13 percent between age 22 and
24 to 14 percent between ages 25 and 27 before falling sharply to 3 percent between
age 37 and 39. Variations for the 75th percentile household are more dramatic. Table
4 shows that the debt-to-income ratio for the 75th percentile household rises from 45
percent for households aged between 22 and 24 to 54 percent households aged 25 to
27 before falling to 20 percent for households aged 37 to 39.
Indebtedness is highly skewed. In the whole sample, the median household debt
to income ratio is just 5 percent. Table 5 shows that a quarter of households have
debt to income ratios of more than 29 percent and 10 percent have debt to income
ratios of more than 84 percent. Just focusing on those households with some debt,
we see that the debt distribution is still quite skewed. 25 percent of households have
debt to income ratios of less than 8 percent. However, 25 percent also have debt to
income ratios of more than 53 percent. And 10 percent have debt to income ratios
that exceed 120 percent.
Social security wealth is considerable for young households. Table 2 shows that
11total social security contributions for both the with-debt and the without-debt sam-
ples are broadly similar. For the median household in our sample with debt, the
social security wealth to income ratio is 64 percent and for the mean household is 85
percent. As expected, given social security rules and life-cycle income proﬁles, social
security wealth rises rapidly over the life cycle. Table 4 shows that social security
wealth to income ratio grows from 22 percent of income for households aged between
22 and 24 to 120 percent of income between for households aged 37 to 39.
Most interestingly, the data bears out our basic claim that households could wipe
out much of their unsecured debt if they had access to their social security wealth.
To measure the eﬀects of social security wealth on debt, we construct “social secu-
rity augmented debt” by subtracting social security wealth from household debt. If
social security wealth exceeds debt for a particular household, then social security
augmented debt equals zero. Table 5 shows what happens to the distribution of debt
when we allow access to social security wealth. In the whole sample, the incidence of
unsecured debt falls from 62 percent of households to 17 percent. Of those households
that have debt, 72 percent can eliminate it when they have access to social security
wealth. For those that cannot eliminate their debt, the level of indebtedness falls
dramatically. The 90th percentile household has debt equal to 84 percent of income;
after gaining access to social security wealth the 90th percentile household has debt
equal to 33 percent of income. Among those households with some debt, the debt to
income ratio of the 75th percentile household falls from more than half to just 4 per-
cent. It should be noted that these numbers should be seen as upper bounds. Given
the structure of the PSID, we can only measure the actual social security wealth for
one member of the household. Debt, however, is for all household members.11
In terms of aggregates, the decline in total debt and total interest paid for the
U.S. economy resulting from allowing households under 40 to use the social security
wealth to pay oﬀ non-collateralized debt is large. Table 6 shows some aggregate
11We experimented with imputing the spouse’s social security wealth given the spouse’s current
age and work status. Under plausible assumptions, the percent of households with positive debt
after also allowing access to the spouse’s social security wealth falls to 14 percent.
12calculations. Using PSID sample weights and census data, we calculate that allowing
households to pay oﬀ non-collateralized debt with social security wealth would reduce
total household debt by more than $100 billion and reduce total annual household
interest payments by $11.5 billion per year – or about $500 for every household that
has non-collateralized debt.
3 A life-cycle model
We now construct a model of life-cycle consumption with social security. Our house-
hold enters the labor force at age 21, retires and no longer receives labor income
after age 65 and dies at age 80 with certainty. We assume that labor is supplied
inelastically and that household income evolves deterministically over the life-cycle.
The assumption of inelastic labor supply is a strong one, and we revisit the issue in
the last section. Our solution for optimizing households allow for stochastic variation
in labor income but we go with a deterministic speciﬁcation for two reasons. First,
our focus is on the life-cycle aspects of borrowing and saving, not the high-frequency
variation. Second, Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003) show that the predictions of our
model for wealth accumulation for relatively impatient households with labor income
risk are similar to those of our model with more patient households with no labor
income risk. To account for this, we estimate the model with diﬀerent time discount
rates.
Households can trade three ﬁnancial assets: They can buy equity with stochastic
net return ˜ rE, bonds at a net risk-free rate rL, and borrow at the rate rB ≥ rL.
Households can buy unlimited positive quantities of stocks and bonds and can borrow
unlimited positive amounts but they cannot take short positions in equity or bonds,
nor can they borrow negative amounts. We impose the condition that a household
must pay oﬀ all debts before it dies, which implies that the household cannot borrow
more than the present value of all its future labor income discounted at the borrowing
rate rB.
We consider two types of households: An optimizing household chooses a plan for








where ca is consumption at age a, Et is the expectations operator conditional on
time-t information, β is a time discount factor. A rule-of-thumb household does not
take advantage of ﬁnancial markets at all and sets consumption equal to income less
mandated contributions to social security while working and equal to social security
beneﬁts when retired.
We solve the model for optimizing households computationally using methods
developed in Judd, Kubler and Schmedders (2002). For details on our numerical
solution, see the appendix to Davis, Kubler and Willen. Table 7 lists key features of
our parameterization of the model. We draw the reader’s attention to three aspects
of our parameterization.
First, our choice of asset returns follows Campbell (1999). We set the annual
risk-free investment return to 2 percent, the expected return on equity to 8 percent
and the standard deviation of equity returns to 15 percent. All returns are in real
terms.
Second, Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003) present evidence that the borrowing rate
exceeds the riskless lending rate by 10 percentage points. Of those ten percentage
points, charge-oﬀs for uncollected loans (i.e., defaults) account for 1.3 percent of the
loan value. Conservatively, we assume that the marginal and average borrower are the
same and thus we specify a wedge equal to 8 percent, which yields borrowing rate of 10
percent. Our model is partial equilibrium, so we don’t attempt to explains the origins
of the wedge between borrowing and lending rates. However, Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Shubik (2003) and Bisin and Gottardi (1999) present general equilibrium models
in which the prices paid by buyers and the prices received by sellers of ﬁnancial assets
diverge because of asymmetric information.
Third, for the life-cycle income processes, we adopt parameter values estimated
by Gourinchas and Parker (2002) from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), adjusted as described in Davis, Kubler
14and Willen. The Gourinchas and Parker (GP) labor income series is after-tax and
we make the simplifying assumption that income taxation would be invariant to our
proposed schemes.12
To carry out the welfare comparisons, we use certainty-equivalent consumption
levels. To obtain certainty-equivalent consumption, we ﬁrst calculate lifetime ex-
pected utility, U, for a given consumption proﬁle. We then ﬁnd the constant level of
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3.1 Social security system
Our social security system works in the following way. Households pay a proportional
tax while working. Upon retirement, optimizing households receive a lump-sum pay-
ment equal to the value of an annuity paying a ﬁxed fraction of the average of the
highest 35 years of income. Rule-of-thumb households receive the annuity.
Our system diﬀers from the real social security system in three fundamental ways:
First, both contributions and beneﬁts are strictly proportional to income whereas
in the real social security system, contributions and beneﬁts vary non-linearly with
income. Let’s focus on the contributions ﬁrst. In the real world, social security
contributions are a ﬁxed portion of income up to a cap. Thus household contributions
to social security are a declining fraction of income. In our model, there is no cap but
this omission actually strengthens our results. We argue below that the one problem
with social security is that it forces households to save when their income is relatively
low. The real system makes the problem worse by raising the tax rate as income goes
down.
12Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ and Neumann (2001) show that by redistributing income over the life-cycle,
pension plans can have adverse tax consequences. In some of our policy experiments, we potentially
change the life-cycle proﬁle of pre-tax income signiﬁcantly (by increasing the employer contribution
to social security) which could aﬀect many aspects of household decision-making. We do not attempt
to model these eﬀects. However, we remind the reader that in our policy experiment of exempting
households from social security prior to age 30, these eﬀects will be small.
15How do beneﬁts diﬀer between our social security system and the real one? In our
model and in the real world, social security beneﬁts depend on income in the highest
35 years of income. However, in the real world, the proportion of one’s income that
one receives in retirement depends on the level of one’s income. Speciﬁcally, the
marginal increase in retirement income for a dollar of labor income falls with income.
Thus, the real social security system reduces relative income for those who have
done relatively well and increases relative income for those who have done relatively
poorly. In essence, the social security system provides a sort of income insurance for
households. Since income is non-stochastic in our model, such a feature would not
play a signiﬁcant role, but it does mean that our model ignores a potential beneﬁt
of a social security system. However, in all our policy experiments (aside from the
straw man of eliminating social security altogether), the beneﬁts portion of the social
security system remains unchanged.
Second, we give a lump-sum to optimizing households rather than an annuity in
retirement. We do this because in our model an annuity reduces household welfare. To
see why, note that in our model households can replicate an annuity with a lump sum
if they want and can often do better, for example, if they want their consumption
to slope down. Thus, if we eliminate social security, welfare improves even in the
absence of any other distortion. We view this as a problem for the model in light
of arguments, discussed in the introduction, that private annuity markets generally
cannot replicate the annuity provided by social security. By eliminating the annuity
feature from social security, we ensure that the method of provision of beneﬁts is
not a liability for social security. As noted above, our policy experiments typically
have no eﬀect on the retirement portion of social security – they guarantee exactly
the same payment stream as the existing system. So whatever welfare beneﬁts an
annuity confers are preserved in our policy experiments. We do, however, report the
annuity value of the lump sum as a percentage of income for comparison purposes.
Third, we build on an idea due to Hubbard and Judd (1987), who propose that
the social security system exempt young households from contributing. For example,
we consider a social security system in which only households over the age of 30
16contribute. To maintain the relationship between contributions and beneﬁts, we
adjust the level of contributions later in life so that the total discounted contributions
under all plans are identical. Below, we discuss this adjustment in depth.
Table 7 shows the basic parameters of our social security system. We draw the
reader’s attention to two possibly unfamiliar terms: “internal lending rate” and “in-
ternal borrowing rate.” The internal lending rate (ILR) is the implied rate of return
on social security contributions in our system and is usually referred to as the “in-
ternal rate of return” in the literature. For example, in our model, the ILR equals
the rate of return on investment of contributions that yields the retirement lump-sum
beneﬁt we select. We actually work backwards: we choose a level of contributions
and an internal lending rate to get our lump-sum beneﬁt. Leimer (1994), in a widely
cited article, calculates that the internal lending rate on social security contributions
of those currently entering the social security system is 1.7 percent We round up and
assume that the internal lending rate is 2.0 percent. In our baseline scenario, this
implies that the replacement rate in retirement equals around 43 percent.13
The notion of an internal borrowing rate (IBR) relates to our analysis of alter-
native social security arrangements. In our simulations, we will consider two policy
experiments. First, we will allow households to withdraw money from the social se-
curity system to pay oﬀ debts. Second, as mentioned above, we allow households to
push back the point in the life cycle at which they start to contribute to social security.
To maintain balance between contributions and beneﬁts, we increase the level of con-
tributions later in the life-cycle. We view the reduction in contributions (from either
the exemption or the withdrawal) as a loan: we allow households to increase their
after tax income today in exchange for a reduction in income in the future. Reducing
contributions today at a cost of increased contributions later in life is tantamount to
giving a household a loan from current social security contributions to be paid back
in installments at some point in the future. We call the interest rate on this loan the
internal borrowing rate. In our baseline scenarios, we set the internal borrowing rate
13The Social Security Administration in 2003 states that their target replacement rate is 42 percent
(See http://www.ssa.gov/kc/fact sheet 14 exp.htm).
17equal to the internal lending rate. We also consider scenarios in which the internal
borrowing rate exceeds the internal lending rate. The existing social security system
does allow some of this sort of “borrowing”: the earlier a household retires, the lower
the level of beneﬁts the household receives. In eﬀect, when a household retires early,
it borrows against future beneﬁts. Simple calculations show that the implied internal
borrowing rate roughly equals the internal lending rate when a household opts for
early social security beneﬁts.14
3.2 Basic results of the optimizing model
In this section, we outline the basic implications for life-cycle consumption and port-
folio choice of our model for optimizing households. For a thorough discussion of the
results of the model, see Davis, Kubler and Willen (2003). In the discussion that
follows we will use the term “private saving” to measure total wealth of the house-
hold not including social security wealth. Note that our “lump-sum” assumption
means that for optimizing households all wealth in retirement is “private saving.”
Four aspects of the solution are relevant to our discussion of social security.
First, the relationship between equity holdings and the borrowing rate is non-
monotonic. Consider a small modiﬁcation to the baseline scenario in which the ex-
pected return on equity is 8 percent and the borrowing rate is 8 percent. With this
speciﬁcation, no one would ever borrow money to buy equity since such an investment
would have zero expected return and would increase household exposure to risk.
Suppose we lower the borrowing rate: Equity holdings go up. Even a small reduc-
tion in the interest rate would turn borrowing to buy equity into a winning propo-
sition. Thus, reductions in the borrowing rate increase equity demand. Conversely,
suppose we raise the borrowing rate: Equity holdings will also go up. Households
borrow for consumption purposes early in life and as they age, they pay oﬀ the debt.
Until they pay oﬀ the debt, however, purchasing equity makes no sense; the expected
return on borrowing to buy equity is now negative. Thus, if we raise the borrowing
14Authors’ calculation using beneﬁt and life expectancy information from the Social Security
Administration web site.
18rate, households borrow less for consumption purposes, which means they need to
spend less time paying oﬀ their debts, which means that they can start saving (and,
as a result, buying equity) sooner. So equity demand reaches a minimum when the
borrowing rate equals the expected return on equity. Since we choose a borrowing
rate of 10 percent, which exceeds, but not by much, the expected return on equity, we
can say two things about our model. First, household demand for equity will be rel-
atively low in all our simulations. And second, no household will ever simultaneously
hold debt and equity.
As one would expect in a life-cycle model, borrowing (saving) and equity holding
are highly sensitive to the shape of the age-income proﬁle. Panels 1-5 of Table 8
show consumption, stock and bond holdings, debt, and social security wealth for
households age 22 to 39. Panel 1 shows our baseline speciﬁcation in which the life-
cycle proﬁle is the “pooled” estimate from Gourinchas and Parker. Two features of the
borrowing proﬁle stand out. First, the level of borrowing is considerable – peaking
at 45 percent of income between the ages of 28 and 30. Second, for the baseline
household, borrowing has a hump-shaped proﬁle. The household accumulates debt
from age 21 until roughly age 30 and then starts paying it oﬀ. Figure 1 shows the age
income proﬁles for diﬀerent educational attainments as estimated by Gourinchas and
Parker. Panels 2 to 4 show the estimates of our model with these alternative age-
income proﬁles. High school educated households (Panel 2) borrow signiﬁcantly less
than the baseline; college educated households (Panel 3) borrow signiﬁcantly more.
Notice from Figure 1 that the age-income proﬁle is less steep for high school educated
households, particularly before age 30, compared to the baseline. In contrast, Figure 1
also shows that the age income proﬁle for college educated households is much steeper
than the baseline until age 30. One interesting thing to note is that college educated
households only accumulate debt from age 22-24 – after that they decumulate. With a
ﬂat income proﬁle (Panel 4), households never borrow and by the age 37 to 39 period,
accumulate assets worth more than three times annual income; households in the
baseline speciﬁcation accumulate none by the age of 39. Panel 5 shows that increasing
the subjective discount factor reduces debt and increases asset accumulation, as one
19would expect.
With reasonable parameters, the model can generate life-cycle borrowing patterns
similar to those we observe in the data. Our baseline household has a life-cycle debt
accumulation pattern roughly matches that of the 25th percentile household in Table
4. The household in the model starts a little lower, accumulates more and its debt
level peaks a little later. Both the high school educated household and the baseline
household with a high discount factor generate borrowing patterns similar to the
median household. The focus of this paper is on debtors, which motivates our choice
of a household that is roughly the median debtor as our baseline.
Lastly, the gains from equity ownership are quite small in this model. How much
is the right to trade equity worth to households? The column labeled “equity beneﬁt”
in Table 8 shows the percentage increase in certain equivalent lifetime consumption
of a household which can trade equity compared to one that cannot. For our spec-
iﬁcations with realistic age-income proﬁles, the ability to invest in equity increases
lifetime consumption by 2 to 3 percent. To put this number in perspective, the gains
are on the order of 40 percent in the standard Merton-Samuelson version of this
model. Why does equity ownership have so little eﬀect on lifetime consumption in
our model? The reason is simple. In the Merton-Samuelson model, households can
borrow at the return on riskless bond (i.e., 2 percent in this model). Households can
realize arbitrarily large returns with no investment by borrowing at 2 percent and
investing in equity with an expected return of 8 percent. Crucially, they can also
use low interest unsecured borrowing to borrow against these future excess returns
and increase their current consumption accordingly. In our model, equity does aﬀord
substantial increases in consumption; however, those increases occur late in life and
thus have a comparatively small impact on lifetime utility. This is due to the fact
that household income is low while young and it is expensive for households to bor-
row. Such a model with a wedge between borrowing and lending rates predict equity
holdings that are more in line with household data.
203.3 Eﬀect of social security over the life-cycle for optimizing
households
Our simulations show that for optimizing households the existing social security sys-
tem leads to signiﬁcantly higher levels of debt, lower private savings, lower consump-
tion and lower utility. We ﬁrst discuss life-cycle aspects of social security and then
consider overall measures. The deleterious eﬀect of social security for optimizing
households follows directly from our assumptions about borrowing. A household that
can borrow at the riskless rate can undo social security completely. For example,
as Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes (1999) point out, only a borrowing constrained
household stands to gain from investing social security in equities, since an uncon-
strained household would have invested the optimal amount in equity anyway.
Figure 2 shows results of our simulations with our baseline social security system.
What are the diﬀerences between the choices optimizing households with and without
social security?
First, the upper left panel of Figure 2 shows that the household with social security
accumulates signiﬁcantly more debt. Initially, the diﬀerences are quite small; at age
26, social security leads to a small increase in debt. But at age 30, the household
without social security stops accumulating additional debt whereas the household
facing social security continues. The contrast is most stark at age 34: the household
with social security has more than $10,000 dollars of debt and the same household
without has none.
Why don’t households stop borrowing completely when we eliminate social secu-
rity? Eliminating social security has two eﬀects. On one hand, it increases current
income relative to retirement income, which increases saving. At the same time,
households are liberated from the internal rate of return for a large portion of their
investments. The upper left panel of Figure 3 illustrates this point. The line marked
“existing” shows the percentage of household saving (including social security wealth)
allocated to equities in the existing system – which is zero until age 40 and never ex-
ceeds 50 percent. The line marked “optimal” shows the percentage for a household
21that faces no social security system – which equals 100 percent except for a couple of
years shortly before retirement. The change in portfolio returns tilts total household
income and induces borrowing early in life.
Second, social security depresses stock and bond holding throughout the life-cycle
but increases total saving early in the life cycle. The reduction in stock and bond
holding under a system with social security follows from the increased borrowing
documented above. Households are forced to save when they do not want to. As a
result, they borrow to increase consumption. In our model, households that borrow
never invest in bonds or stocks because the cost of borrowing always exceeds the
returns on stocks and bonds. Thus, the wealth accumulation phase of the life-cycle
only starts when the debt phase ends – and social security pushes that age back from
36 to 41 (see the upper right panel of Figure 2.) But if we include social security
wealth, the picture is quite diﬀerent. Forced social security saving exceeds debt from
the beginning which means that total wealth for households with social security is
always positive (see the lower left panel of Figure 2) . By contrast, households without
social security have negative total wealth until they emerge from debt at age 35.
Third, social security depresses consumption throughout the life-cycle. As the
lower right panel of Figure 2 shows, the social security-induced consumption gap is
roughly constant at a little more than $1000 dollars until shortly before retirement.
Throughout working life, social security drives down after-tax income. Households
can (and do) borrow to make up for the forced social security, saving. But, initially,
households without social security borrow comparable amounts and don’t pay social
security yielding higher overall consumption. When households without social se-
curity start to accumulate wealth at age 35, the gap actually narrows slightly and
then widens shortly before retirement as the eﬀects of higher investment in equities,
described above, kick in.
Overall, social security depresses consumption, increases debt, decreases saving
and decreases utility for optimizing households. Table 9 shows that on a population
weighted basis, households with social security (Panel 1) consume $2,000 less per
year on average, have $1,600 more debt and save about $40,000 less than otherwise
22identical households that face no social security (Panel 11). Eliminating social security
raises lifetime certain equivalent consumption by 7.5 percent.
3.4 Eﬀect of social security over the life-cycle for “rule-of-
thumb” households
The top panel of Figure 4 shows that for a rule-of-thumb household, social security
provides a reasonable approximation to the optimizing portfolio rule. The dashed
line marked “income” shows pre-social security income. If there were no social se-
curity, a rule-of-thumb household would consume nothing in retirement. With our
preference speciﬁcation, such a household would have inﬁnitely negative utility – cer-
tain equivalent consumption would be zero. Social security reduces income during
a household’s working life and increases it in retirement, as show by the line mar-
ket “post-SS income.” The line marked “optimal” shows the optimal consumption
of a baseline forward-looking household which does not participate in social security.
For clarity, we assume that this optimizing household does not trade equity either.
Clearly, social security generates a much better consumption stream for the rule-of-
thumb household. But it still has problems. Early in life, consumption is too low; in
middle age, it is too high; and in retirement, it is too low again.
4 Alternate social security policy proposals
We consider two policy experiments. First, we take households that are already in
the social security system and have accumulated both social security wealth and
unsecured debt and we look at the beneﬁts of using social security wealth to pay oﬀ
debt. We call this the payoﬀ proposal. Second, we consider the whole life-cycle and
try to design a social security system that doesn’t force households to both borrow
and save at the same time. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate a proposal to exempt young
households from contributing to social security. We call this the exemption proposal.
We evaluate policy proposals using four criteria. First, does the policy proposal
23prevent optimizing households from simultaneously borrowing and holding social se-
curity wealth – the problem with which we motivated this paper? More generally,
what happens to household consumption, saving and debt? Second, what are the wel-
fare consequences for optimizing and rule-of-thumb households? Third, we compare
our proposals with much-discussed alternatives that seek to raise the internal rate of
return, or in our parlance, the internal lending rate. And ﬁnally, for the exemption
proposals, we ask how the proposal aﬀects the average household net contribution to
social security.
For all our experiments, we require that the replacement rate in retirement equal
or exceed the replacement rate in the existing social security system.
4.1 The payoﬀ proposal
According to Table 2, our average debtor household is around age 30 and has average
debt around 60 percent of income. Suppose we take such a household and assume that
they have social security wealth equal to their debt (in reality, their social security
wealth is higher). Consider the following policy proposal. Allow that 30-year-old
household to withdraw cash from social security. To make sure this is an admissible
plan, we require that the household increase its subsequent contributions from 10.6
percent of labor income to 12.8 percent of labor income which assures us that the
retirement replacement rate equals the 43 percent guaranteed by the existing system.15
This proposal is not relevant for rule-of-thumb households since in our model such
households do not accumulate debt.
How well does this payoﬀ proposal do? First, does the payoﬀ proposal elimi-
nate the problem of simultaneous unsecured borrowing and social security investment
among optimizing households? The answer is not completely. The upper left panel
of Figure 5 shows debt and social security wealth with our proposal (“reduced debt”)
and without (“existing”). Household use most but not all of their social security
wealth to pay down debt. A small portion is used to ﬁnance increased consumption.
1512.8 percent would be the tax rate necessary to pay for the withdrawal of 60 percent of income
from accumulated social security wealth to pay oﬀ existing debt.
24To maintain the higher level of consumption, the household continues to borrow small
amounts until age 33 at which point it starts to pay oﬀ the debt. Since households
must continue to make social security contributions, our proposal does not eliminate
the problem of simultaneous debt and borrowing although it reduces it dramatically.
As discussed above, eliminating the debt allows households to save in equities ear-
lier (and reduce debt payments) resulting in a wealth eﬀect, which in turn causes
households to want higher consumption.
Second, the payoﬀ proposal greatly increases utility the optimizing households.
Table 10 shows that our proposal (Panel 2) raises certain equivalent consumption
by 2.1 percent for optimizing households versus the existing social security system
(Panel 1). To put this in perspective, Panel 5 of the table shows that eliminating
social security altogether would raise certain equivalent consumption for optimizing
households by almost 10 percent.
Third, the payoﬀ proposal compares well with alternative proposals for social
security. Panels 3 and 4 of Table 10 show the eﬀects on utility of increasing the
internal lending rate but otherwise keeping the social security system as is. Allowing
households to use social security to pay oﬀ debt yields a welfare payoﬀ equivalent to an
increase in the internal lending rate (ILR) of between 3 and 4 percent for an optimizing
household. For a rule-of-thumb household, an increase in the ILR generates a much
bigger increase in utility than our proposal. The diﬀerence in eﬀects for diﬀerent
types of households results from the unwillingness of rule-of-thumb households to
trade equity on their own. Optimizing households already buy some equity on their
own, so their eﬀective “lending rate” is much higher than the return on social security.
But for rule-of-thumb households, increasing the ILR is akin to forcing them to invest
in equity with consequently large welfare improvements. We will return to this theme
in the next section when we consider our proposal for exemptions to social security
contributions.
To help illustrate the payoﬀ proposal, we suggest an alternative interpretation.
What we are doing here is allowing household to spend money now (to pay oﬀ debt)
on condition that they pay money later in the form of increased social security con-
25tributions. In other words, our household is borrowing money. Speciﬁcally, our
household borrows 60 percent of income and pays it back in 35 annual installments
each one equal to 1.7 percent of annual income – the diﬀerence between the standard
social security contribution and the one necessary to pay oﬀ the debt. It is easy to see
that the interest rate on the loan equals the ILR. But who is the household borrowing
from? One way to view it is that the household is borrowing from itself. Later on, we
will argue that the sensible interpretation is as a loan from the government but when
the internal borrowing and lending rates are the same, either interpretation is valid.
So what the household is really doing is investing social security wealth in a loan to
itself. The calculations show that reallocating a social security portfolio into loans to
oneself is equivalent to reallocating your social security portfolio into an asset that
pays a little more than 3 percent return for sure.
4.2 The exemption proposal
In this section, we propose changes in the age structure of social security contributions.
Speciﬁcally, we build on Hubbard and Judd’s idea (1987) to ameliorate the life-cycle
eﬀects of social security by providing young households with an “exemption” from
social security contributions. Recall that we require the households increase their
contribution after the exemption expires to assure that their retirement replacement
rate equals the replacement rate in the existing system. We consider three age-based
exemptions: no contributions before age 30; no contributions before age 40; and no
contributions before age 50. As we discuss in the conclusion, the latter two policies
will require large changes in the household’s marginal tax rate after exemption expires.
Such changes in the tax structure could induce changes in household behavior which
we abstract from at this time. However, the before age 30 exemption requires very
small changes in the marginal tax rate after the age of 30. As a result, the labor
supply eﬀects of changing tax rates after the age 30 exemption expires would be
negligible.
Again we return to the four questions posed in the beginning of this section.
First, do these policy proposals prevent households from simultaneously borrowing
26and holding social security wealth? Yes; Figure 6 shows that all three exemption
programs ensure that households have no debt by the time they start contributing
to social security. For the age 40 and 50 exemptions, this result is not surprising.
The upper left panel of Figure 2 shows that with the current social security system,
households pay oﬀ most of their debt by age 40 anyway. But even with the age 30
exemption, households are out of debt by the time social security taxes take eﬀect.
Optimizing households anticipate the 12.9 percent permanent drop in income that
will occur at age 30 and start saving in advance.
More broadly, the payoﬀ proposal improves the general household balance sheet.
Table 9 shows per capita levels of of consumption, debt and savings for optimizing
households under the diﬀerent exemption plans (panels 2, 3, and 4, respectively).
Panel 1 of Table 9 shows the baseline model with the existing social security system.
Panel 11 of Table 9 shows the results of the model with no social security system.
The age 30 exemption leads to an almost complete elimination of unsecured debt.
Households increase consumption and save slightly more. Why do both consumption
and saving go up? As we explained in Section 3.1, an exemption as we deﬁne it can
be interpreted as a loan: it raises income today in return for a reduction in future
income. There is, however, a key diﬀerence between an exemption and unsecured
debt in our model: instead of paying a credit card company 10 percent, an exempted
household pays the government 2 percent. Delaying contributions to social security
until later in the life cycle leads to continued increases in saving and consumption
but also to increases in debt. Why do both debt and saving go up? The longer
the exemption, the steeper the income proﬁle when young (see the bottom panel of
Figure 4). At the same time, the longer the exemption, the bigger the discontinuous
drop in income when the exemption ends. The sharp future decline in income causes
a household to increase saving today.
Second, what happens to utility? The exemption generate substantial increases
in utility for both optimizing and rule-of-thumb households. The age 30 exemption
increases certainty equivalent consumption by roughly comparable amounts for opti-
mizing and rule-of-thumb households – 3.4 and 3.3 percent respectively. An age 40
27exemption helps both types of households – but the gains are bigger for the optimiz-
ing households – 5.5 percent versus 4.8 percent. And age 50 exemption generates a
large welfare gain for optimizing households – 6.7 percent of annual consumption. In
contrast, the age 50 exemption results in a small reduction in welfare for the rule-
of-thumb household vis-a-vis the age 40 exemption. For the optimizing household,
the age 50 exemption reduces the burden of social security by about 90 percent (6.7
change in utility/7.5 change in utility). In the next section, we explain why the
exemptions work so well.
Third, how do the utility gains from the payoﬀ proposal compare to gains to simply
raising the internal lending rate? For both optimizing and rule-of-thumb households,
the answer depends on whether we change contribution rates when we increase the
internal lending rate. Suppose we assume that contribution rates remain the same
as it is currently. Then for optimizing household, exemptions clearly dominate (see
panels 5, 6, and 7 of Table 9). Even an increase in the internal lending rate to 5
percent increases certain equivalent consumption by an amount less than that for the
age 30 exemption. By contrast, for rule-of-thumb households, raising the internal
lending rate is a winning proposition. Raising the ILR to 3 percent generates gains
comparable to those of the exemptions but higher ILRs lead to much larger welfare
gains (compare panel 4 of Table 9 to panel 7 of Table 9). This welfare gain for rule-
of-thumb households should not be surprising. If we leave contribution rates constant
and increase ILR, replacement rates in retirement must increase dramatically. For
example, a 5 percent ILR leads to a replacement rate of 88 percent of pre-retirement
income, holding contributions constant. In that case, the decline in cash ﬂow at the
time of retirement for rule-of-thumb households is small. Stabilizing income during
retirement has large welfare beneﬁts for rule-of-thumb households.
Now suppose we we simultaneously lower withholding rates when we increase the
ILR so that the replacement rate in retirement remains constant at 43 percent. Now
the results are reversed. The gains to rule-of-thumb households are relatively small.
An increase of the ILR to 5 percent generates a welfare increase in between the age 30
and the age 40 exemptions. For optimizing households, however, the gains are much
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age 40 exemption. Why are the eﬀects so diﬀerent? For rule-of-thumb households,
the opportunity to invest at 5 percent is extremely valuable – since they don’t invest
in equity (or in anything). But for optimizing households, even a 5 percent ILR is
still less than they get investing in equity at 8 percent.
Finally, how do our proposals aﬀect the net household contributions to social
security. As we said in the introduction, we make no assumption here about how
social security is funded. As far as households are concerned, social security withholds
contributions and pays out beneﬁts. But social security is basically a pay-as-you-go
system and its long run solvency depends on taking in as much in contributions
as it pays out in beneﬁts. In other words, the solvency depends on having non-
negative net contributions. So we ask how the payoﬀ proposal (and raising the ILR)
would aﬀect the level of net contributions. To answer this question, we assume that
aggregate wage growth equals the baseline ILR of 2 percent. This means that if there
were no population growth, social security would always take in exactly as much in
contributions as it pays out in beneﬁts. In addition, our exemptions should have no
eﬀect on net contributions. In fact, given the year 2000 population distribution, our
exemptions do aﬀect net contributions. The age 40 to age 50 group is relatively large
and so the age 30 and age 40 exemptions shift contributions to that group, which raises
net contributions. The age 50 exemption shifts contributions away from the age 40 to
50 group and reduces net contributions. In contrast, raising the ILR always leads to
a deterioration in the level of net contributions. However, proposals to raise the ILR
are always paired with proposals to generate additional income through investment in
stock. But our results on net contributions illustrate that we can generate signiﬁcant
welfare improvements without investing in stock or reducing the solvency of the social
security system. In Section 4.4, we show by changing the internal borrowing rate we
improve the solvency of social security while preserving some of the welfare beneﬁts.
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Let’s ﬁrst consider the rule-of-thumb households. First, we consider existing social
security. The top panel of Figure 4 shows that the existing social security system
lowers consumption to below the optimal level early in life and allows it to exceed the
optimal level in middle age and to fall short of the optimal level in retirement. The
bottom panel Figure 4 shows after-social security income for the three exemptions
compared to optimal consumption for a household that can’t trade equity. All three
exemptions increase consumption early in life and lower it in middle age. In each
case, the cost of the exemption is a discontinuous fall in consumption at the start of
the exemption. The cost of the discontinuity illustrates why rule-of-thumb households
prefer the age 40 to the 50 exemption in spite of the fact that from age 50 to retirement
the age 50 exemption almost exactly matches the optimal proﬁle.
For the optimizing households, the explanation for the success of the exemptions
is more complex because social security not only interferes with savings decisions but
also with portfolio allocation decisions. We ﬁrst consider the saving decision and
then the portfolio allocation decision. The top right panel of Figure 3 shows total
saving (including social security wealth) in excess of the no-social security optimum
for a baseline household under four scenarios: the existing social security system;
and social security with the three age-based exemption rules. As the picture shows,
deviations from the optimum get progressively smaller as we extend the exemption.
We note two odd features of the excess saving. First, households in all the social
security systems oversave relative to the no social security benchmark until roughly
age 60. For households in the existing social security system, this is not too puzzling
– the system forces them to save when they would actually like to borrow. But in
the age 40 and age 50 exemptions, forced saving starts after the household would
have started saving anyway. So why do they oversave even before the exemption
starts? The reason is that the exemption leads to a discontinuous but predictable
drop in income (17.9 percent for the age 40 exemption and 30.4 percent for the age
50 exemption, see Table 9). Households engage in private saving in anticipation of
30this – which you can see in the lower panel of Figure 3, which shows what we call
excess private or non-social security saving.
The second odd feature of the life-cycle excess saving proﬁle is that households in
all the social security systems undersave relative to the no social security benchmark
after roughly age 60. Why does this happen? The lower panel of Figure 3 shows that
private saving falls relative to the non-social security benchmark when the exemption
ends – the forced saving crowds out private saving. Since the return on private saving
is much higher than the return on forced saving, wealth accumulates much more
quickly for households that don’t have social security.
We now discuss how social security aﬀects portfolio allocation and show that
exemptions reduce the distortions generated by social security. The upper left panel
of Figure 3 compares portfolio allocations to equities over the life cycle for the four
social security schemes and the no social security optimum. In the absence of social
security, households invest all their money in equities until quite late in the life cycle
– which we see in the line marked “optimal” in the ﬁgure. Households invest almost
all their money in equity in virtually all portfolio choice models with labor income
which follows from the fact that ﬁnancial wealth is a small fraction of total wealth –
which includes human capital – until late in the life cycle. Thus households can invest
almost all their ﬁnancial wealth in equity but still have relatively low exposure to it.
Under the existing social security system, equity’s share never exceeds 50 percent and
is zero for much of the life cycle. Before the age of 40, households facing the existing
social security system engage in no private saving – all their saving is forced and all
forced saving is invested at the internal lending rate – 2 percent in our case.
The top right panel of Figure 3 shows that exemptions close the gap. For the age
40 and 50 exemptions, households never invest less than 50 percent in equities and
invest 100 for much of the life cycle. Why? The basic reason is that with exemptions,
households engage in considerably more private saving. Consider ﬁrst a household
with the age 30 exemption. They start saving before they reach 30 in anticipation
of a decline in income when the exemption ends. At age 30, they start dissaving to
maintain consumption, but by the age of 35, they are accumulating again and all
31their accumulation goes into equity. Now consider a household facing an age 40 or
age 50 exemption. In both cases, they save entirely in equities in anticipation of the
exemption. Then when the exemption ends, they start to draw down their private
saving and replace it with forced saving, which they cannot invest in equities.
To quantify the eﬀect of exemptions on optimal saving and on optimal portfolio
allocation, we conduct the following exercise. Table 11 shows the eﬀects of exemptions
in the Hubbard-Judd scenario in which there are no risky assets. We note three
things. First, the increase in certain equivalent consumption from eliminating social
security altogether is much smaller – roughly $1,000 compared with the $1,700 in
the risky asset scenario. Second, an age 30 exemption wipes out about 70 percent of
the portfolio loss and an age 40 exemption wipes out 97 percent. By contrast, when
there are risky assets, an age 30 exemption only eliminates 45 percent of the portfolio
loss and an age 40 exemption eliminates about 70 percent. As the top right panel
of Figure 3 shows, going from the age 40 exemption to the age 50 exemption brings
portfolio allocation much closer to the optimal level.
4.4 Raising the internal borrowing rate
In Section 4.1, we characterized exemptions as loans from the government to the
household to pay the social security contribution that year. The exemptions, as
discussed in the previous two sections, implicitly assume an internal borrowing rate
(the interest rate on the loans) equal to the internal lending rate which roughly equals
the riskless lending rate. What if the government charged a higher borrowing rate?
Since households already pay 10 percent for unsecured debt as it is, why should we
require the government to charge only 2 percent?
In Table 12, we show the eﬀects of higher borrowing rates on households when
we introduce an age 40 exemption and charge diﬀerent internal borrowing rates.
According to our results, social security could charge as much as 7 percent interest and
still make both types of households better oﬀ. The main upside for social security is an
obvious increase in net contributions to social security. Using a 5 percent borrowing
rate, for example, would more than double net contributions using 2000 population
32weights. Using 2020 population weights, a 5 percent internal borrowing rate would
turn a per capita deﬁcit for social security into a per capita surplus.
5 Conclusion and directions for future research
In this paper, we show that the current social security system leads many households
to save at low interest rates and borrow at high interest rates. We show empirically
that simply allowing households to use the money they have paid in to the social
security system to pay oﬀ debt would allow many households to get out of debt
completely and others to dramatically reduce their exposure to high interest unsecured
debt. We then considered two policy experiments aimed at resolving this problem in
the context of a life-cycle model with both optimizing and rule-of-thumb households.
First, we considered allowing households to use the money in social security to get out
of debt. And then we considered options to change the age structure of social security
to prevent households from borrowing while they also contribute to social security.
We found that both proposals, but in particular the latter, solved the problem in
question and led to signiﬁcant increases in household welfare, consumption and saving
and reductions in high-interest unsecured debt.
We showed that our options generated comparable and often higher welfare in-
creases than popular proposals to increase the return on investment in social security.
And they do so without any major administrative change to the social security sys-
tem. There are no individual accounts. There is no uncertainty about returns. And
it preserves the basic functions of social security: it does not subject rule-of-thumb
households to politically unacceptable risks.
There are, however, two limitations of our analysis with respect to optimizing
households. First, we assume exogenous labor supply. Some of our policy experiments
introduce major changes in both the level of social security taxes and the life-cycle
proﬁle of them. For example, compared to the existing system, the age 50 exemption
leads to a signiﬁcant reduction in taxes before age 50 and a huge increase in taxes
after age 50. Such a change in the tax code could lead to major changes in life cycle
33labor supply. However, our preferred model of exempting households up to the age
of 30 (as opposed to the age 40 or age 50 exemptions) results in large welfare gains
and only requires an increase in the marginal tax rates after the age of 30 from 10.6
percent to 12.9 percent. Relative to changes in the social security tax rate observed
over the last quarter century, this change is very small and would have minimal eﬀects
on household labor supply.
Second, we have constructed a partial equilibrium model. Obviously, if a policy
change has signiﬁcant partial equilibrium eﬀects, one would imagine that it would
have signiﬁcant general equilibrium eﬀects. Researchers have found, for example,
that investing some of the social security trust fund in equities – which we modeled
as an increase in the internal lending rate – would have signiﬁcant macroeconomic
eﬀects (see Bohn, 1999, and Diamond and Geanakoplos, 2002, for examples).
A model that incorporates both endogenous labor supply and general equilibrium
would strengthen our results signiﬁcantly. However, as noted above, for one policy
proposal – the age 30 exemption – neither extension should have a sizeable eﬀect
on our conclusions. First, the increase in withholding on labor income is very small
– from 10.6 to 12.9 percent of income, comparable in magnitude to the increase in
social security withholding that took place between 1980 and 1994. Second, Table 9
shows that an age 30 exemption has a small impact on consumption demand (a little
more than a 1 percent increase) and a small impact on saving (a little more than a 4
percent increase). The main change is a dramatic reduction in consumer unsecured
debt. Such a change could aﬀect the wedge between borrowing and lending rates.
Analyzing the general equilibrium aﬀects of such a policy change on consumer credit
markets would be a fruitful area for future research.
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38Table 1: Summary of results. Number in box is certain equivalent lifetime consumption

















Age 30 exemption 23.0 (3.4%) 21.1 (3.3%)
Age 40 exemption 23.4 (5.5%) 21.4 (4.8%)
Age 50 exemption 23.7 (6.7%) 21.4 (4.6%)
Raise IRR to 4% 22.5 (1.4%) 21.9 (7.0%)
Age 40 exemption +
Raise IBR to 5%
23.0 (3.4%) 21.1 (3.0%)
Notes:
1. See Section 3 for a complete description of the model.
2. See equation (1) for the calculation of certainty-equivalent (CE) consumption. Consumption is
measured in 1987 dollars.
3. With no social security, rule-of-thumb households earn no income in retirement and thus consume
nothing. Since utility is CRRA with RRA=3, certain equivalent consumption is zero.
39Table 2: Descriptive statistics for 1999 PSID sample, by debt holding. Notes – Sample
includes 1) all unmarried households with heads between the age of 22 and 39 and 2)
married households with heads between the age of 22 and 39 where the head also has a
complete earnings history. Head’s total social security contributions are computed by the
authors using the household heads earnings history and social security tax formulas. The
contributions are accumulated from the head’s ﬁrst year in the labor force through 1998.
Household net liquid assets are deﬁned as the sum of cash, checking and saving balances,
stocks, corporate bonds, and Treasuries less unsecured debt. Household net ﬁnancial asses
are deﬁned as the some of stocks and corporate bonds less unsecured debt. Sample is
split by households with no unsecured debt (column II) and households with some positive
amount of unsecured debt (column III). All dollar amounts are reported in 1996 dollars.










Age of the household head 31.6 32.3 31.1 <0.01
Percent of households with...
Sex of head = Male 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.58
Race of head = Black 0.12 0.16 0.09 <0.01
Married 0.55 0.50 0.58 <0.01
Unsecured debt 0.62 – – –
Head’s 1998 labor income
Mean 33,600 35,400 32,500 <0.05
Median 27,400 27,400 27,800 0.40
Numbers below all divided by income
Head’s total SS contributions
Mean 0.85 0.91 0.81 <0.01
Median 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.02
Household unsecured debt
Mean 0.36 – 0.58 –
Median 0.05 – 0.22 –
Household total net-worth
Mean 2.02 3.07 1.80 <0.01
Median 0.66 1.00 0.48 <0.01
Household net liquid assets
Mean 0.24 0.78 -0.08 <0.01
Median 0 0.08 -0.08 <0.01
Household net ﬁnancial assets
Mean 0.04 0.50 -0.24 <0.01
Median 0 0 -0.16 <0.01
Sample Size 2,077 844 1,233
40Table 3: Portfolio composition of PSID households under 40, by debt holding. “Cash”
includes cash, checking and saving accounts. For other queries, see notes to Table 2.










Owning a home 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.81
Having positive cash 0.83 0.74 0.89 <0.01
Owning any stocks 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.99
Owning any bonds 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.06
Owning stocks or bonds 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.26
Owning cash, stocks or bonds 0.85 0.77 0.90 <0.01
Owning a business 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.91
Having negative net worth 0.16 0.01 0.26 <0.01
Having negative net liquid assets 0.39 0 0.63 <0.01
Having negative net ﬁnancial assets 0.50 0 0.82 <0.01
Sample Size 2,077 844 1,233
Table 4: Median ratio of net ﬁnancial assets to income, by age range. See notes to Table
2.
Age range
Debt/Income by %ile SS Wealth
/Income 50 75 90
22 – 24 0.13 0.45 1.54 0.22
25 – 27 0.14 0.54 1.11 0.33
28 – 30 0.12 0.37 0.90 0.60
31 – 33 0.03 0.27 0.70 0.70
34 – 36 0.02 0.20 0.54 1.07
37 – 39 0.03 0.20 0.56 1.20
41Table 5: Distribution of unsecured debt to income before and after adjusting for social
security wealth. Notes – Data is from the 1999 PSID. Sample in columns I and II includes
1) all unmarried households with heads between the age of 22 and 39 and 2) married
households with heads between the age of 22 and 39 where the head also has a complete
earnings history (2,077 households). Sample in column II includes all unmarried households
with heads between the age of 22 and 39 (513 households). Social security augmented debt
is deﬁned as unsecured debt less total accumulated social security contributions of the head.
Social security augmented debt is constructed to be non-negative. In other words, if social
security contributions exceed the household’s unsecured debt, social security augmented











Percent with positive unsecured debt
0.62 1.00 1.00
Distribution of debt to income ratio
25th Percentile 0.00 0.08 0.09
50th Percentile 0.05 0.22 0.25
75th Percentile 0.29 0.53 0.60
90th Percentile 0.84 1.20 1.72
Mean 0.36 0.58 0.79
Panel B
Percent with positive social security augmented debt
0.17 0.28 0.31
Distribution of social security augmented debt to income ratio
25th Percentile 0 0 0
50th Percentile 0 0 0
75th Percentile 0 0.04 0.14
90th Percentile 0.33 0.74 0.97
Mean 0.19 0.32 0.50
42Table 6: Aggregate eﬀects of allowing households to use social security wealth to pay
oﬀ non-collateralized debt. All dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars. Data comes from the
1999 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Debt reduction is calculated by using accumulated
social security wealth to pay oﬀ existing non-collateralized debt. Non-collateralized debt
assumes an interest rate of 10% while social security wealth assumes an interest rate of 2%.
To compute total debt reduction for the U.S. population, we use 104 million households
(Census Bureau), 36.6% of which have heads between the ages of 22 and 40 (PSID weighted
data), and 60.8% of which have non-collateralized debt (PSID weighted data).
Average debt reduction for households
with debt between the ages of 22 and 40
(1999)
$6,225
Average annual interest saving resulting
from debt reduction for households with
debt between the ages of 22 and 40 (1999)
$498
Total debt reduction for households aged
22 to 40 (1999)
$144.1 billion
Total annual interest saved by households
aged 22 to 40 (1999)
$11.5 billion
43Table 7: Parameter Settings
Parameter Baseline Alternative values
Relative risk aversion 3
Annual discount factor 0.97 0.98
Age of labor force entry 21
Age of retirement 65






Start year 21 30,40,50
Contribution rate 10% see tables
Internal lending rate 2% see tables
Internal borrowing rate 2% 3%,4%,5%






22-24 25-27 28-30 31-33 34-36 37-39 22-39
1 0.97 Baseline 2.39
Consumption 16.8 18.0 19.2 20.5 21.8 23.3 19.9
Stocks+bonds/Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt/Y 0.27 0.40 0.45 0.42 0.32 0.16 0.33





Consumption 16.4 17.5 18.7 20.0 21.3 22.7 19.4
Stocks+bonds/Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Debt/Y 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.08
SS wealth/Y 0.30 0.60 0.90 1.18 1.45 1.72 1.09
3 0.97 College 3.03
Consumption 19.9 21.2 22.6 24.1 25.7 27.0 23.4
Stocks+bonds/Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.04
Debt/Y 0.50 0.48 0.33 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.22
SS wealth/Y 0.28 0.53 0.81 1.12 1.45 1.77 1.06
4 0.97 Flat 8.55
Consumption 22.8 23.8 24.7 25.7 26.8 27.9 25.3
Stocks+bonds/Y 0.46 0.94 1.41 1.90 2.42 2.96 1.68
Debt/Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SS wealth/Y 0.31 0.64 0.99 1.36 1.75 2.16 1.20
5 0.98 Baseline 3.62
Consumption 16.4 17.7 19.0 20.5 22.1 23.4 19.8
Stocks+bonds/Y 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.05
Debt/Y 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.11
SS wealth/Y 0.30 0.58 0.85 1.12 1.40 1.67 1.06
Notes:
1. All parameters are baseline (Table 7) unless otherwise indicated.
2. Consumption is measured in 1987 dollars.
3. Equity beneﬁt measures the percentage increase in certain equivalent consumption yielded by investment in equity.
4
5Table 9: Eﬀects of exemptions. All amounts in thousands of 1987 dollars unless otherwise noted. See Table 10 for deﬁnitions.







Optimizing C = Y Optimizing C = Y
Cons.
Net SS
contrib. (∆) (∆) Cons. Debt Saving
1 21 10.6 2 43
22.2 20.5
26.1 3.4 58.3 25.5 1.1
(-0.0) (0.0)
2 30 12.9 2 43
23.0 21.1
26.4 0.2 60.8 25.2 1.3
(3.4) (3.3)
3 40 17.9 2 43
23.4 21.4
26.8 0.8 72.4 25.2 1.4
(5.5) (4.8)
4 50 30.4 2 43
23.7 21.4
27.3 1.3 84.9 25.6 1.0
(6.7) (4.6)
5 21 10.6 3 54
22.3 21.3
26.4 4.0 52.3 25.8 0.7
(0.6) (4.0)
6 21 10.6 4 68
22.5 21.9
26.7 4.7 45.9 26.2 0.2
(1.4) (7.0)
7 21 10.6 5 88
22.7 22.3
27.2 6.0 38.9 26.8 -0.5
(2.3) (9.1)
8 21 8.6 3 43
22.7 20.8
26.7 3.4 60.2 26.0 0.6
(2.2) (1.8)
9 21 6.9 4 43
23.1 21.1
27.2 3.4 61.9 26.5 0.1
(4.0) (3.2)
10 21 5.4 5 42
23.4 21.3
27.5 3.5 63.5 26.9 -0.3
(5.6) (3.9)
11 21 0.0 2 0
23.9 0.0
28.1 1.8 99.0 26.9 0.0
(7.5) (-100.0)
4
6Table 10: The eﬀects of allowing households to use social security wealth to pay oﬀ debt.







Optimizing C = Y
(∆) (∆)
1 -0.6 0.6 10.6 2 42
25.3 21.9
(0.0) (0.0)
2 0.0 0.0 12.8 2 43
25.9 22.6
(2.1) (2.9)
3 -0.6 0.6 10.6 3 51
25.6 23.4
(1.1) (6.9)
4 -0.6 0.6 10.6 4 64
25.9 24.7
(2.4) (12.5)




1. ILR is the internal lending rate (See Section 3.1 for an explanation.)
2. Private saving equals stocks plus bonds minus debt.
3. Scenario is baseline (see Table 7).
4. Replacement rate is the annuity value of the lump-sum payment from social security as a fraction
of the top 35 years of income.
5. Utility is certain equivalent consumption (see equation (1)).
6. ∆ is diﬀerence from existing. case).
47Table 11: Eﬀects of exemptions. Scenario is baseline (see Table 7) except that households cannot trade equity. See Table 10 for
deﬁnitions.







Optimizing C = Y Optimizing C = Y
Cons.
Net SS
contrib. (∆) (∆) Cons. Debt Saving
1 21 10.6 2 43
21.7 20.5
24.1 5.6 66.3 25.5 1.1
(0.0) (0.0)
2 30 12.9 2 43
22.3 21.1
24.4 0.9 65.5 25.2 1.3
(3.1) (3.3)
3 40 17.9 2 43
22.6 21.4
24.2 2.8 61.9 25.2 1.4
(4.4) (4.8)
4 21 0.0 2 0
22.7 0.0
24.2 3.2 77.4 26.9 0.0
(4.5) (-100.0)
4
8Table 12: Eﬀects of changes in the Internal Borrowing Rate (IBR) (See Section 3.1 for an explanation) for an age 40 exemption. Scenario
is baseline (see Table 7) except where noted. See Table 10 for deﬁnitions.







Optimizing C = Y Optimizing C = Y
Cons.
Net SS contrib.
(∆) (∆) Cons. Debt Saving 2000 2020
1 21 10.6 2 43
22.2 20.5
26.1 3.4 58.3 25.5 1.1 -0.1
(-0.0) (0.0)
2 40 17.9 2 43
23.4 21.4
26.8 0.8 72.4 25.2 1.4 0.0
(5.5) (4.8)
3 40 21.6 4 43
23.1 21.2
26.4 0.6 74.5 24.6 2.0 0.6
(4.2) (3.7)
4 40 24.0 5 43
23.0 21.1
26.1 0.4 76.0 24.2 2.4 1.0
(3.4) (3.0)
5 40 26.9 6 43
22.7 20.9
25.8 0.3 78.2 23.7 2.9 1.4
(2.4) (2.0)
6 40 30.3 7 43
22.5 20.6
25.5 0.2 81.0 23.1 3.5 2.0
(1.2) (0.7)
7 40 34.4 8 43
21.3 20.3
25.0 0.2 84.0 22.4 4.2 2.6
(-3.9) (-1.0)
8 21 0.0 2 0
23.9 0.0
28.1 1.8 99.0 26.9 0.0 0.0
(7.5) (-100.0)
4
9Figure 1: Expected labor income proﬁles.
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1Figure 3: Excess saving over the life cycle for various diﬀerent social security schemes. Excess saving equals the diﬀerence between total
saving (including social security) under the listed scheme and total saving under the optimal scenario for the household in which there
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